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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

DDI #2063-82 11 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH

: Chairman, National Intelligence Council Bl

FROM

Acting National Intelligence Officer for USSP 55

Acting National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT

: Meeting with Ambassador Hartman

Three members of SOVA and I spent about an hour with Ambassador Hartman this morning. Since you may be seeing him soon, I thought you might be interested in a short summary of the main points he made with us:

--Items he plans to discuss with "the Intelligence Community"

-Exchanges: He feels that they are more beneficial to us because they afford us a glimpse into a closed society whereas the Soviets can get information through other means in the open US society. We may want to control exchanges more tightly but envisioned restrictions as well as current visa controls are self-defeating.

-Technology Transfers: The goal is worthwhile but we must specify what we want to control. The allies will not support broad-gauged "economic warfare."

-PNG Policy: Too many PNGs will endanger some of our own activities.

--Economic Situation: The Soviet economic predicament is attributable both to the general state of the world economy and to Soviet inefficiency. The Soviet emphasis so far seems to be on better management and use of information systems rather than on more fundamental reforms (although some Soviets stress the latter). Sargent Shriver is dealing with the Soviets on management techniques and has started to bring the French component of his firm into the discussions—a development which may foreshadow a move to circumvent a US ban on sophisticated computer sales by using French firms for any such transaction.

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--Society: The intelligentsia which is openly questioning the Soviet system is a thin layer. However, the cynicism and corruption throughout society is incredible. Basically hardly anybody believes in the system anymore. The Embassy is feeling the effects of this malaise during the construction of its new building--absenteeism and drunkeness are endemic. The Ambassador is pushing his people to get away from their offices and go see first-hand how Soviet society is working.

--Leadership Politics. Brezhnev is senile; collegiality works but it is extremely hard to get decisions. Brezhnev seems closest to Chernenko--in early December, as the Polish crisis was reaching a peak, Brezhnev and Chernenko spent four straight evenings together at hockey matches! It is important to follow personal maneuverings but we must not lose sight of the fact that the leadership is united in its desire to retain its current power and privileges. Romanov represents the type of leader who will probably emerge on top in the long run: He projects the image of managerial efficiency, leadership, energy, toughness, and ability to hold both his personal power base and society together.

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cc: DCI

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